Review of T. Irwin, PLATO'S MORAL THEORY

Terence Irwin. Plato's Moral Theory: The Early and Middle Dialogues. Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1977. Pp. 376 + xvii. $21.00.

Irwin's book is an extremely important contribution to the literature on Plato. It painstakingly reconstructs a systematic picture of the moral positions of Socrates and Plato as they emerge from the early and middle dialogues. Irwin considers these positions philosophically important and at least partially worthy of defense. He will have nothing to do with facile refutations and offhand dismissals; he insists that we take Plato seriously. In the execution of this project, Irwin displays sensitivity to problems of classical scholarship combined with a high degree of philosophical sophistication. The result is worthy of extended study.

Although the main exposition, interpretation, and evaluation is to be found in the text (where all Greek is either translated or transliterated), another extremely valuable part of the book is the fifty-eight pages of notes, which contain interesting discussions in support of particular interpreta­tions and a consideration of recent scholarship. There is a bibliography that lists 278 items, a general index, and an index locorum.

One feature of Irwin's approach calls for comment. While he is definitely claiming to interpret Plato, he does not hesitate to "read into" the text certain consequences or implications or to suggest a line of argumentation that does not have explicit textual support (p. 3). Part of the reason for this is Irwin's feeling that "the character of a Platonic dialogue itself leaves us unsatisfied" (p. 3). Irwin also admits that he is often "charitable" to Plato in that he minimizes certain "flaws and obscurities" (p. 3). While this approach will not recommend itself to everyone, it certainly seems justified in that it enables us to take Plato seriously as a philosopher, rather than merely as an intellectual museum piece.

The main line of interpretation that Irwin advances runs as follows. Socrates and Plato both hold certain paradoxical theses in moral philosophy, such as the unity-of-virtue doctrine and the claim that virtue must be in the agent's interest. In addition, Socrates holds that virtue is craft knowledge only. Like any craft, its value for a rational practitioner lies in the production of an independently desirable product. For Socrates, presumably, both virtuous and nonvirtuous persons agree on what this desirable end is, so that it could be defined in undisputed terms; the virtuous person would differ from the nonvirtuous only with respect to the means of achieving it. Thus, for Socrates, the virtues are of instrumental value only. Irwin admits (e.g., p. 7) that the Socratic dialogues offer no satisfactory account of this final good that is taken to be the product of virtue, although in the Protagoras it is definitely specified as the agent's pleasure. Furthermore, the Socratic denial of akrasia relies upon the assumption that the end product or final good is some­thing we all want and that therefore we will never fail to exercise our virtue-craft. Thus, virture requires only a cognitive component; no affective component is necessary.

The claim that virtue is a craft knowledge only and the denial of akrasia are rejected by Plato, although he substitutes equally paradoxical doctrines in their place, for example, the thesis that virtue must be good in itself and that the virtuous person must have knowledge of the Forms. Plato begins to reject Socratic claims in the Gorgias and Meno; he rejects them even more deci­sively in the Phaedo and Republic. His espousal of the doctrine of recollection and of the theory Forms is important in that it involves a rejection of the craft analogy (CA). Plato now sees that there can be no definition of the good in undisputed terms, as demanded by the CA. Since moral properties are not definable in terms of nonmoral ones, as Socrates had thought, morality cannot be merely a craft. Therefore, morality "can be learnt only through the elenchos. by the method of recollection" (p. 7). In theory, for Socrates, the final good should be discoverable independently of the elenchos. But "Plato denies that the elenchos can be replaced by a craft: he allows moral knowledge only through mutual support and coherence of beliefs about the virtues and about the good, with no appeal to an external standard, indentifiable without disputed moral terms, prom­ised by the CA" (p. 9).

In addition to rejecting Socrates' view of moral knowledge, Plato also rejects the denial of akrasia (Gorgias, Phaedo, Republic IV); this results from Plato's recognition of good-independent desires.

The abandonment of these central Socratic doctrines creates certain difficulties for Plato. In the first place, the CA had provided an excellent account of how morality is rational: it is a craft that produces a desired product. Now that Plato rejects this view he needs to supply an alternative justification for morality. In place of Socrates' claim that virtue is an instrumental good, Plato holds that virtue is a good in itself and benefits the agent. This raises the question of whether the commonly recognized virtues (especially justice) are in fact beneficial to the agent (a claim Soc­rates had defended with respect to temperance and courage). In the Republic Plato takes on the task of defending justice independently of Socratic assumptions about moral knowledge. He tries in Republic I-IV to defend his view that justice in the sense of psychic harmony is beneficial to the agent. The problem of how psychic harmony would involve concern for others Plato attempts to solve with his theory of rational desire and love (Symposium, Phaedrus). "He claims that the development of rational desire results in love for the Form of Justice and other moral properties, and in the desire to propagate them in other people. Since it will be in someone else's interest to become just, the just man will be concerned with other people's interests" (pp. 10- I I).

Irwin spends the final chapter (8) giving a critical examination of Plato's position. He discusses criticisms based upon Plato's ethical egoism and upon his teleology. He argues that whatever there is of importance in the criticism of egoism ultimately reduces to problems with teleology. He argues, furthermore, that these criticisms are not obviously decisive, although Plato's position does involve him in certain unacceptable positions with regard to human rights and freedom.

Detailed critical discussion of Irwin's main theses is impossible within the space available here. However, let me briefly isolate several of the most controversial and debatable of his claims.

Irwin's view that Socratic knowledge is craft knowledge only (p. 72, p. 84, et passim) is potentially misleading in that it underemphasizes the apparent fact that Socrates is looking for the account of a universal and an essential cause (Euthyphro 5d. 6d-e: cf. Hippias Major 287c-d, 289d), something with an objective existence independent of human cognition about it. The knowledge of such an eidos or idea seems to be just as "theoretical" and independent of the production of a product as the knowledge that twice two is four. although admittedly this latter proposition can be employed within the context of a craft. It should be noted that Irwin rejects (p. 296, n. 28) Gould's view that Socratic knowledge is only a "knowing how," so that he need not think that craft knowledge lacks the "bit of theory."

Irwin holds that the hedonism in the Protagoras is genuinely Socratic (p. 10.3) . rather than simply part of an ad hominem strategy. He thinks that the hedonism is necessary for the cogency of Socrates' argument and is completely consistent with and in fact demanded by other features of Socrates' theory, especially the CA. He seems to underestimate, however, the problem of the absence of hedonism from the other early dialogues. If hedonism is such a natural answer to Socrates' problems, why do we hear of it only in the Protagoras? There is not so much as a hint of it in other early dialogues (as Irwin seems to admit, p. 103), and one might surely argue that their general spirit is incompatible with hedonism (cf. Apology 30a-b, 38a, 41e; Crito 49b, et passim).

Irwin suggests that when Plato rejects Socrates' CA in the middle dialogues. he accepts the implication that since there is no final good that is specifiable in non disputed terms, there is no external standard for correctness of views about morality. "Plato rejects the external standard; moral beliefs cannot be tested for correctness except by the procedure of the elenchos, which may yield a systematic, coherent account of moral judgments, but may not link them to any external standard. When Plato rejects Socrates' guarantee of objectivity for moral beliefs, and offers no substitute, he rejects the demand for such a guarantee as illegitimate" (pp. 159-60). Irwin also claims that there is no reason to ascribe to Plato the view that Forms are intended as "absolute standards," the cognition of which (perhaps by some sort of direct acquaintance) issues in height­ened moral certainty (p. 321, n. 47). But surely the talk of the unhypothetical first principle (Republic 510b, 511b, 533c-d), and the need for it in order to convert hypotheses into knowl­edge, shows that Plato would not have been satisfied with mere consistency. unanchored to an external standard (see Cratylus 436c-d). And does not the whole theme of Books VI-VIII, the need for the philosopher kings to reach an apprehension of the Good (conceived of as an indepen­dently existing standard), clearly illustrate Plato's view that the direct apprehension of Forms does indeed issue in heightened moral certainty (see Republic 520c)? To abandon this yiew is, one might argue, to abandon the very core of Platonism.

Irwin holds that "the Good is not some further being besides the Forms; when we have correctly defined them, connected in a teleological system, we have specified the Good, which just is the system" (p. 225). But the "logic" of the of the Sun simile (as revealed e.g. by 508b-e. 509b) seems to tell against this interpretation; 507b5-7 seems direcectly to imply that the Form of the Good is one among the other Forms.

There are other places where Irwin offers provocative interpretations, such as his analysis of the Symposium's "ascent" passage (pp.209ff.) and its relevance to the problem of connecting Platonic justice with concern for the interests of others.

As Irwin says in his preface, he has "not tried to play safe" (p. viii). The result is an exciting book that challenges a number of orthodoxies in the interpretation of Plato's moral philosophy. Defenders of these received views will find that Irwin gives them much to think about.

RICHARD HOGAN